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ABSTRACT  
In his seminal work Patterns of Democracy, Arend Lijphart shows that, among other 
factors, power sharing enhances the quality of democracy. Lijphart’s analysis, how-
ever, suffers from a rather unsystematic and arbitrary choice of measures of demo-
cratic quality and from an implicit treatment of consensus democracy as a one-
dimensional concept. Our reanalysis aims at correcting for both. We make use of 
two new and unique datasets, the Democracy Barometer (DB) and the Consensus 
Democracy Indicators. Our results suggest that Lijphart is right, yet only in principle. 
Indeed, overall democratic quality seems to profit from power sharing. However, our 
findings lead to two important refinements of Lijphart’s democratic quality thesis. 
First, power sharing does not foster every aspect of the quality of democracy and, 
even worse, brings about low transparency. Second, the combination of consensus 
and majoritarian traits appears to matter. In particular, consensus-unitary democra-
cies fare best – particularly if accompanied by consensual traits on the third consen-
sus dimension that was not originally contemplated by Lijphart – and notably better 
than pure consensus democracies. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Almost three decades have passed since Arend Lijphart introduced his famous dif-
ferentiation between consensus and majoritarian democracy (Lijphart, 1984). It is 
widely perceived as ground-breaking. Mainwaring (2001), for instance, declares it 
the most influential and prominent typology of modern democracies, and Taagepera 
(2003) describes Lijphart’s work as a standard for work to come. Its enormous im-
pact within – and beyond – political science is not least reflected by the mass of fol-
low-up studies it has produced (e.g. Freitag, 1999; Vatter, 2000; Jung, 2001; Arm-
ingeon, 2002; Ganghof, 2005; Roberts, 2006; Vatter, 2007; Freitag & Vatter, 2008; 
Vatter, 2009; Vatter & Bernauer, 2009). 
Lijphart, however, has not restricted himself to distinguishing consensus from ma-
joritarian democracies. In his seminal 1999 piece Patterns of Democracy, he further 
assesses the empirical performance of the different types of democracies. In particu-
lar, Lijphart employs regression analyses to demonstrate that consensus democra-
cies outperform their majoritarian counterparts in both the quality of democracy 
and some aspects of macro-economic management and public policy. Thus, Lijphart 
concludes that consensus democracies are not only no worse than majoritarian ones 
but are “better, kinder and gentler” forms of ruling.  
Despite or maybe because of its prominence, Lijphart’s work has been widely criti-
cized. Most of the critics focus either on the typology itself or on Lijphart’s analysis 
of the effects of consensual traits on macro-economic and socio-cultural perfor-
mance (for an excellent review, cf. Bormann, 2010). In our contribution, we intend 
to reinvestigate an aspect of Lijphart’s work that, arguably, did not catch the atten-
tion it deserves: the claim that consensus democracy is associated with a higher 
quality of democracy. There are at least three good reasons to revisit Lijphart’s dem-
ocratic quality thesis. First, though Lijphart (1999, p. 276ff) employs various indica-
tors of the quality of democracy, such as voter turnout, government-voter proximity, 
and women’s representation in parliament, his choice of measures of democratic 
quality, all in all, appears rather unsystematic and arbitrary. An assessment of demo-
cratic quality requires a more systematic deduction of its central elements. Further-
more, the two indices of democratic quality that Lijphart employs coming closest to 
this requirement – the Polyarchy and Vanhanen indices – are widely criticized for be-
ing too minimalistic to capture the subtle differences regarding the quality of de-
mocracy in established democracies (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). Democracy is a 
complex phenomenon and a minimalist measurement cannot do it justice (Lauth, 
2004). Testing the democratic quality thesis calls for a better measure of democratic 
quality. Hence, we make use of the Democracy Barometer (DB), a recently intro-
duced instrument promising a more accurate measure of the quality of democracy in 
established democratic regimes (Bühlmann et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Based on a 
strict theoretical deduction of the fundamental elements of representative democ-
racy, the DB allows for an assessment of the fine differences that exist between es-
tablished democracies. Its multidimensional conception enables, in particular, an 
analysis of the association of consensual traits not only with overall democratic qual-
ity but also with its various elements. 
A second reason for reconsidering the democratic quality thesis is Lijphart’s implicit 
treatment of consensus democracy as a one-dimensional concept when assessing 
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the performance of the different types of democracies (Roller, 2005; Schmidt, 2010). 
A close reading of his 1999 book leads to the conclusion that it is not consensus de-
mocracy on the whole that is better, kinder, and gentler. With the exception of infla-
tion,
4
 the second, i.e. the federal-unitary dimension, is not correlated significantly 
with either of Lijphart’s measures of democratic, macro-economic, or socio-cultural 
performance. According to his analysis, it is, in fact, not consensus democracy on the 
whole that improves, e.g., democratic quality but consensual traits on the first di-
mension, i.e. power sharing. When analyzing the performance of consensus democ-
racies, Lijphart, thus, neglects the multidimensionality of his own typology. The two-
dimensionality of his typology suggests that there not only two (majoritarian and 
consensus) but four types of democracies: consensus-federalist (e.g. Switzerland), 
consensus-unitary (e.g. Sweden), majoritarian-federalist (e.g. United States), and 
majoritarian-unitary (e.g. United Kingdom) democracies (Bormann, 2010). Our anal-
ysis aims at taking into account the multidimensionality of Lijphart’s typology. We do 
not, in other words, restrict our analysis to the effect of the different dimensions of 
consensus dimensions on democratic quality but analyze as well the effect of differ-
ent combinations of values on the consensus dimensions on the quality of democra-
cy. We are, thus, able to assess the democratic performance of different types of 
democracies, i.e. whether pure consensus democracy or a combination of consensus 
and majoritarian traits performs better. 
In combining these two reasons, we can highlight a third one. Taking seriously the 
idea of the multidimensionality of the quality of democracy as well as of consocia-
tional democracies, we can indeed test how the different patterns of democracy are 
connected with the different functions of the quality of democracy. This contribution 
can be seen as a first approach to describe different relations. 
Our analysis further responds to some of the harshest criticism against both Li-
jphart’s typology and his sample. On the one hand, we employ an improved measure 
of the consensual and majoritarian features of democracies that is more up to date 
and, at the same time, incorporates direct democracy into the typology: the Consen-
sus Democracy Indicators (Vatter & Bernauer, 2010). On the other hand, we concen-
trate our analysis on established democracies that belong to the OECD group.
5
 Li-
jphart is criticized for his country selection for three reasons (Armingeon, 2002; 
Schmidt, 2010). First, he excludes all new democracies from Eastern Europe such as 
Poland or the Czech Republic. Second, he includes countries with very different de-
grees of modernity. Whether it makes sense to compare the United States to Papua 
New Guinea in such a small sample is, at the least, disputable. Third, the consensus 
democracies that Lijphart considers tend to be wealthier than majoritarian ones. The 
benevolent effects that Lijphart ascribes to consensus democracy could, therefore, 
be the consequences of both sample biases and modernity (though Lijphart tries to 
control for the latter, at least at some places). To avoid confusing most-similar with 
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 However, the association between consensus democracy on the second, i.e. the federal-
unitary dimension, and low inflation rates is widely attributed to the central bank independ-
ence variable. 
5
 Our sample consists of 26 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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most-dissimilar case design, it appears sensible to choose the countries a little more 
carefully and concentrate on economically well-developed, established democracies. 
Our contribution proceeds as follows. In the first part, we briefly review Lijphart’s 
idea of consensus democracy and its recent enlargements. We then focus on the ar-
guments linking consensus democracy with democratic quality. In the second part, 
we discuss the new dependent variable for which we want to test the thesis of a 
positive connection between consensus democracy and the quality of democracy: 
the Democracy Barometer. In the third, empirical section, we present different anal-
yses reinvestigating Lijphart’s thesis. We summarize our findings in the concluding 
section. 
LIJPHART REVISITED 
LIJPHART ’S TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRACY   
Lijphart distinguishes two basic types of democracy: consensus and majoritarian 
democracy (Lijphart, 1984, 1999). They have to be understood as ideal types in the 
sense of Max Weber, i.e. as being diametrically opposed to each other with regard 
to power distribution. Power is concentrated, on the one hand, in a majoritarian 
democracy. The ideal majoritarian model features, among other elements, a bare 
majority cabinet, a two-party system, a disproportional system of elections, a unitary 
and centralized government, and unicameralism. In contrast, a pure consensus de-
mocracy stresses both power sharing and dividing featuring, inter alia, a broad coali-
tion cabinet, a multi-party system, a proportional electoral system, a federal and de-
centralized government, and a strong bicameralism.  
Lijphart (1999) not only proposes a typology of democracy but also tackles the ques-
tion of the degree to which actual democracies correspond to these ideal types. The 
degree of consensus (and majoritarian) democracy is measured by ten constitutional 
features and electoral outcomes. Factor analysis on these ten indicators in 36 differ-
ent democracies yields two dimensions. The horizontal one, i.e. the executive-
parties (or power sharing) dimension, comprises the effective number of parliamen-
tary parties, the frequency of single-party government, the average cabinet length, 
the degree of electoral disproportionality, and the interest group system. The se-
cond, vertical, i.e. federal-unitary (or power dividing) dimension, consists of the de-
gree of federalism, bicameralism, strength of judicial review, constitutional rigidity, 
and degree of central bank independence.  
FROM TWO TO THREE DIMENSIONS:  THE CONSENSUS DE-
MOCRACY INDICATORS  
The two-dimensional typology proposed by Lijphart (1999) has received a fair share 
of criticism, which, however, has barely shaken its foundations (Bogaards, 2000; 
Freitag & Vatter, 2008; Ganghof, 2005; Grofman, 2000; Kaiser, 1997; Schmidt, 2010; 
Shikano, 2006; Taagepera, 2003; Tsebelis, 2002). Rather, improved measurements, 
in part encouraged by Lijphart (2003, p. 20) himself, have further developed its valid-
ity (De Winter, 2005; Kaiser et al., 2002; Ganghof, 2005; Schnapp & Harfst, 2005; 
Keman, 2000; Flinders, 2005). The toughest criticism comes in both empirical and 
conceptual forms. Conceptually, Ganghof (2005) challenges Lijphart’s (1999) typolo-
gy because it allegedly fails to distinguish between institutions and behavior. Taa-
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gepera (2003) questions the logical and empirical connections between some of the 
indicators, such as interest group corporatism and the first dimension, as well as 
central bank independence, and the second dimension. Jung (1996, 2001) challenges 
the exclusion of direct democracy. Empirically, Shikano (2006, p. 67-7) replicates the 
analysis of Lijphart (1999) using 2000 bootstrap samples and concludes that three in-
stead of two dimensions should have been taken into account.  
In two articles, Vatter (2009) and Vatter and Bernauer (2009) have presented im-
proved measurements of the consensual and majoritarian features of democracies: 
the Consensus Democracy Indicators (Vatter & Bernauer, 2010). While the basic logic 
of the original typology in terms of its overarching poles of consensualism and ma-
joritarianism is adopted, several changes are carried out. First, the time frame is 
more up-to-date, ranging from 1997 to 2006. Second, several measurements have 
been improved, including executive-legislative relations, cabinet type, and decentral-
ization. It must be added, though, that the specific countries’ values, nonetheless, do 
not change too much, on the whole. Third, direct democracy is incorporated into the 
typology. Direct democracy, arguably, is a form of power sharing in its own right 
(Jung, 2001; Vatter, 2000) with increasing relevance. This goes beyond recent re-
search on direct democracy that fails to connect it to the concept of consensus and 
majoritarian democracy (Hug & Tsebelis, 2002; LeDuc, 2003; Qvortrup, 2002; Setälä, 
2006) and is generally in line with findings by Grofman (2000, p. 53), who provides 
evidence of an independent third dimension of democracy, comprised of direct de-
mocracy alone. 
The incorporation of direct democratic institutions in the assessment of the degree 
of consensus democracy aims at taking into account power relations between the 
governing elite and the population (Vatter, 2009). However, the inclusion of direct 
democracy is not unproblematic since the concept of direct democracy can neither 
be regarded as typically majoritarian nor typically consensual (Lijphart, 1984, p. 31, 
1999, p. 230f). In other words, different forms of direct democracy are different with 
regard to their functions and effects, as they have both majoritarian and consensual 
characteristics. To successfully include direct democracy in the concept of consensus 
democracy, one has, thus, to link systematically the concept of direct democracy 
with Lijphart’s original typology. Vatter and Bernauer (2010) do this by disaggregat-
ing referendums, classifying them in theoretical terms, and subsequently connecting 
them to Lijphart’s two basic forms of democracy, the power sharing (consensus) and 
power concentrating (majoritarian) variants (Vatter, 2000, 2009). More specifically, 
two criteria are applied. First, Vatter and Bernauer (2010) ask who has the right to 
launch a referendum. Two basic forms of referendums ensue: the “controlled refer-
endum,” which the government or a parliamentary majority may launch,
6
 and the 
“uncontrolled referendum,” which non-governmental actors, a minority of voters, or 
a parliamentary minority may initiate.
7
 This distinction allows for the establishment 
of an initial connection to Lijphart’s (1999) two concepts of democracy; whereas a 
referendum that can only be initiated by a ruling majority corresponds to the typical 
features of majoritarian democracy, one that can be launched from the bottom-up 
by a minority of voters or parliamentarians can be conceived as typical of consensus 
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 E.g., the French or the British plebiscite. 
7
 E.g., the optional referendum and the popular initiative in Switzerland. 
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democracy. Second, Vatter and Bernauer (2010) ask who has the ultimate decision-
making authority, i.e. whether the consent of specific quorums is required for ac-
ceptance of a referendum proposal or whether a simple majority suffices. While the 
necessity for a supermajority displays consensual characteristics, the requirement of 
a simple majority belongs to the majoritarian type.  
The aforementioned two criteria referring to both the initiation and decision phase 
of a referendum proposal enable the development of a “majoritarian-consensus” 
classification of different forms of direct democracy (Vatter, 2009).
8
 The question 
remains, however, how to link direct democracy to Lijphart’s two dimensions of de-
mocracy. Vatter and Bernauer’s (2010) empirical findings lead to the conclusion that 
direct democracy – contrary to earlier research (Grofman, 2000) – does not form a 
completely independent third dimension of democracy. Rather, it is connected to 
one of the variables Lijphart (1999) includes in the executive-parties dimension: the 
type of cabinet government. This connection makes sense on theoretical grounds as 
well. It seems a rational answer in a fully developed direct democracy to widen the 
executive formula to encompass all parties that are likely to make efficient use of 
the (uncontrolled) referendum if not co-opted in the government (Neidhart, 1970; 
Vatter, 2009). Otherwise, it is very probable that an enduring blockade of the politi-
cal process emerges as every sufficiently large non-government party constantly 
tries to exert influence on government policies via the referendum. Thus, the more 
consensual traits direct democracy has, the likelier a more inclusive style of govern-
ment in terms of party composition becomes – resulting in oversized cabinets (Li-
jphart, 1999). 
Accordingly, three dimensions of consensus democracy ensue if direct democracy is 
taken into account (see Table 1).
9
 The horizontal one comes close but is not identical 
to Lijphart’s executive-parties dimension. It comprises the effective number of par-
liamentary parties, the executive-legislative relationship, the degree of electoral dis-
proportionality, and the interest group system. The vertical dimension comes close 
to Lijphart’s federal-unitary dimension. It consists of the degree of federalism, fiscal 
decentralization, and bicameralism, as well as the strength of judicial review. Contra-
ry to Lijphart (1999), central bank independence is not included. There are two rea-
sons for this: first, it does not load even modestly on any of the three dimensions. 
Second, policy convergence, as in the example of the European Central Bank, sub-
stantially reduces variance in European Union countries. Constitutional rigidity is left 
out as well because it cannot be attached clearly to one dimension. The third dimen-
sion is the cabinet-direct democracy dimension. Vatter (2009) calls it the top-to-
bottom power relation dimension. It embraces the type of cabinet government (min-
imal winning vs. oversized) and the strength of direct democracy and, thus, describes 
the relationship between the government and the population.   
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 The extent to which direct democratic instruments are actually used is also included in the 
measurement (Vatter & Bernauer, 2010). 
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 Following Vatter (2009), we conduct a principal component analysis with orthogonal Vari-
max-rotated factor loadings. 
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T A B L E  1 :   T H R E E  D I M E N S I O N S  O F  D E M O C R A C Y  ( P R I N C I P A L  C O M P O N E N T  A N A L -
Y S I S )  
 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
Effective Number of Legislative Parties .72 -.01 .38 
Electoral Disproportionality -.83 -.02 .10 
Executive-Legislative Relationship .65 .13 .48 
Interest Group Corporatism .75 -.29 -.05 
Federalism .06 .90 -.17 
Decentralization .17 .78 .15 
Bicameralism -.31 .74 .24 
Judicial Review -.14 .53 -.13 
Oversized Cabinets .11 -.23 .84 
Direct Democracy .01 .13 .74 
Note: Principal Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation.  
The exact location of the countries on the three mutually independent dimensions of 
democracy can best be depicted graphically on a conceptual map of democracy (Fig-
ure 1). The horizontal axis represents the executive-parties and the vertical axis the 
federal-unitary dimension, whereby negative values indicate majoritarian democracy 
and positive values consensus democracy (we use the factor values of the principal 
component analysis calculated with regression analysis). The size of the bubble rep-
resents the cabinet-direct democracy; the bigger the bubble is, the more consensual 
a country is on the third dimension of democracy (Jacoby, 1998). The values on the 
three dimensions generally vary between around -2 and 2. They represent average 
values for the period considered in the empirical analysis, 1997-2005 (N=26).
10
 
F I G U R E  1 :  T H R E E  D I M E N S I O N S  O F  D E M O C R A C Y  
 
Note: Factor scores of the three dimensions from Table 1; positive values = consensus democ-
racy; negative values = majoritarian democracy; the size of the bubbles indicates the factor 
score of the third dimension (cabinet-direct democracy): the bigger the size, the more consen-
sual a country in this third dimension.  
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 We use these data for the analysis that follows. The original data is collected annually for 
the slightly longer period of 1997-2006. In Lijphart’s initial two-dimensional map and the 
three-dimensional conceptual map of Vatter (2009), the signs of the factors are reversed. 
However, to test Lijphart’s thesis of the positive impact on consensus democracy, we decided 
to keep the direction of the dimensions as calculated by the factor analysis in Table 1.  
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CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY AND THE OPERATION OF DEMOC-
RACY  
Lijphart (1999) does not limit his study to the measurement and classification of de-
mocracies. He proceeds to deal with the “so what?” question and, thus, asks wheth-
er the degree of consensus democracy affects the operation of democracy (Lijphart, 
1999, p. 258ff). Lijphart’s starting point is what he conceives as conventional wis-
dom, namely that there is a trade-off between the quality and the effectiveness of 
democratic government. The conventional wisdom posits, in other words, that con-
sensus democracy may provide more accurate representation of minorities and 
broader participation in decision-making (Powell, 1982). Consensus democracy, 
however, is accused of ineffectiveness. “Representative government must not only 
represent, it must also govern” (Beer, 1998p. 25). According to conventional wis-
dom, the one-party majority governments typical of majoritarian democracies are 
more decisive and, thus, more effective policy-makers. 
Lijphart (1999) empirically evaluates this conventional wisdom. With just a few ex-
ceptions, the underlying statistical models are bivariate regressions. The results of 
his analysis are twofold. On the one hand, consensus democracies seem to be at 
least no worse than their majoritarian counterparts with regard to effective policy-
making. According to Lijphart, consensus democracies even outperform majoritarian 
ones when we look at inflation rates or social policy. On the other hand, and of spe-
cial interest in our context, Lijphart concludes that consensus democracy clearly en-
hances democratic quality. He measures democratic quality using a wide variety of 
indicators, such as Dahl’s (1971) Polyarchy and Vanhanen’s (1997) democratization 
indices, women’s representation in parliament and in cabinet, voter turnout, gov-
ernment-voter proximity, and citizens’ satisfaction with democracy. According to Li-
jphart (1999, p. 276ff), all of these indicators of democratic quality are positively cor-
related with the degree of consensus democracy on the horizontal, i.e. the execu-
tive-parties dimension.
11
 In sum, Lijphart’s analysis leads to the conclusion that con-
sensus democracies not only (and contrary to conventional wisdom) are no worse at 
effective governing but that consensus democracies are better, kinder, and gentler 
forms of ruling. 
In our contribution, we aim at retesting Lijphart’s democratic quality thesis by en-
larging the data base both in terms of the measurement of consensus democracy as 
outlined above and in terms of the measurement of the quality of democracy. As set 
forth in the introduction, Lijphart’s measures of democratic quality are criticized for 
not adequately incorporating the multidimensionality of the quality of democracy as 
well as being too minimalistic, rather weak, and not appropriate for this endeavor. 
Therefore, we need a new measure that is able to distinguish the fine-grained differ-
ences in the quality of democracy of the countries in our sample.  
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 However, the vertical, i.e. the federal-unitary, dimension of consensus democracy does not 
correlate significantly with any measure of democratic quality Lijphart employs. 
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THE QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY:  THE DEMOCRACY 
BAROMETER  
The DB is a recently introduced instrument aiming at measuring the quality of de-
mocracy (Bühlmann et al., 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). Its concept is based on liberal as 
well as participatory ideas of democracy and consists of a strict theoretical deduc-
tion of the fundamental elements of representative democracy in three steps.  
First, it is argued that democracy ultimately rests on three fundamental principles: 
freedom, equality, and control. Freedom refers to the absence of heteronomy and, 
hence, requires the protection and guarantee of individual rights under a secure rule 
of law. Equality, particularly understood as political equality, aspires to equal treat-
ment of the citizens in the political process and to equal access to political power. It 
is argued that freedom and equality interact and can constrain each other as well as 
that optimizing and balancing freedom and equality are the core challenges of any 
democratic system. To maintain a dynamic balance between freedom and equality, a 
further fundamental principle of democratic rule is needed: control. Of course, con-
trol is not a simple auxiliary for the balance of the two other principles but is, rather, 
an important basis of democracy itself; it is a means by which citizens maintain the 
accountability and responsiveness of their representatives. 
To guarantee and functionally secure freedom, equality, and control, a democratic 
regime must fulfill several functions. In the second step, these functions are deduced 
from the three principles (see Figure 2).  
Three functions, on the one hand, are deduced from the principle of freedom. The 
existence and guarantee of individual liberties is the most important prerequisite of 
democratic self- and co-determination. Individual liberties primarily secure the invio-
lableness of the private sphere. Individual liberties and political rights require pro-
tection in accordance with the rule of law. “Rule of law” refers to the independence, 
primacy, and absolute warrant of and by the law. This requires the same prevalence 
of rights, as well as formal and procedural justice for all individuals.  
F I G U R E  2 :  C O N C E P T  T R E E  O F  T H E  D E M O C R A C Y  B A R O M E T E R   
 
Source: Bühlmann et al., 2011c 
The principle of freedom is completed by the function of the public sphere. Here, in-
dividual rights have an essential collective purpose: taking part with others in the 
expression of opinions and seeking to persuade and mobilize support are considered 
important components of freedom. 
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The principle of control, on the other hand, consists of three functions as well. In es-
tablished representative democracies, vertical control of the government is estab-
lished via free, regular, and competitive elections that must be vulnerable and con-
testable. The horizontal and institutional dimension of control of the government is 
encompassed by the mutual constraints of constitutional powers. The balance of 
powers depends on the relationship between the executive and the legislature but 
also on additional institutional checks such as constitutional jurisdiction or federal-
ism. To ensure the chain of responsiveness, citizens' preferences must be collected, 
mobilized, articulated, and aggregated by means of elections and then translated in-
to parliamentary seats. However, the chain has a further link, namely responsive im-
plementation, which requires governmental capability.  
Likewise, equality, as the third principle to be ensured, depends on three functions, 
of which the first is transparency. Opacity in terms of secrecy, corruption, or bribery 
is a severe danger for equality. Therefore, the political process must be grounded on 
a culture of openness. In a high-quality democracy, all persons affected by a political 
decision should have the right to participate in shaping this decision. This implies 
that all citizens in a state must exercise suffrage rights and that these rights are used 
in an equal manner. Equal respect for and consideration of all interests by the politi-
cal representatives are possible only if participation is as widespread and as equal as 
possible. In representative democracies, the possibility of co-determination is en-
sured by means of representation agencies. Responsive democracies, thus, must en-
sure that all citizens' preferences are adequately, i.e. descriptively and substantively, 
represented in elected offices. 
It is argued, in a nutshell, that the quality of a given democracy is high when these 
nine functions are fulfilled to a high degree. Because of the tension existing between 
freedom and equality, a simultaneous maximization of all nine functions is impossi-
ble. Democracies are seen as systems whose development is perpetually negotiated 
by political and societal forces. Hence, democracies can weigh and optimize the nine 
functions differently. However, the degree of fulfillment of each of these nine func-
tions can be measured. This requires a third conceptual step: the various functions 
are based on constitutive components. In the stepwise deduction of the concept of 
democracy, the next step comprises the derivation of these components. Hence, 
each function is further disaggregated into two components, which, finally, lead to 
several subcomponents and indicators.  
There is insufficient space to discuss each indicator in this contribution,
12
 but it is 
worth noting that the DB consists of a total of 100 indicators, each of which was se-
lected from a large collection of secondary data and had to meet several criteria: 
first, indicators based on expert surveys are avoided mainly because of the prevalent 
lack of transparency; second, for every subcomponent, indicators from different 
sources are used to reduce measurement errors; and third, to avoid institutional fal-
lacies, each component consists of at least one subcomponent measuring rule of law 
and one subcomponent measuring rules actually in use.  
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 For an extensive description of the concept, the data, and the method, see Bühlmann et al. 
(2011a, 2011b, 2011c) and www.democracybarometer.org. 
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To aggregate the indicators into subcomponents, the indicators are scaled according 
to the best practice method, whereby, for each indicator, the lowest value is record-
ed as 0 and the highest as 100. The other values are assigned relative to these two 
references. This procedure reflects the idea that democracy should be viewed as a 
political system that continuously redefines and alters itself depending on ongoing 
political and societal deliberation.  
The conceptualization of the DB in terms of its different levels of abstraction further 
requires the definition of aggregation rules. The first two levels of aggregation – 
from indicators to subcomponents and from subcomponents to components – are 
based on arithmetic means. In the following steps (components to functions, func-
tions to principles, principles to “quality of democracy”), the idea of optimal balance 
is implemented: the value of the higher level has been calculated with a formula re-




The quality of democracy in 2005 in the 26 countries used in this contribution
14
 var-
ies between 45.9 (Poland) and 88.6 (Denmark). However, the countries also vary 
widely according to the values, i.e. the degree of fulfillment of the nine functions.  
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 To measure variation in the quality of democracy properly, the relationships between prin-
ciples, functions, components, and sub-components must be translated into aggregation rules 
that fit the hierarchical concept of our theory. Our aggregation rule, therefore, is based on the 
following six basic assumptions: (1) Equilibrium is regarded as a positive feature. It indicates 
that, at a certain level, the elements of quality of democracy are in balance. Because the as-
sumption of the underlying theory is that the best democracy is one in which all elements 
show a maximum performance and the worst is one in which all elements show a minimum of 
performance, this is justified. (2) Since we are dealing in the framework of the “blueprint 
countries” with democracies, we cannot apply a simple and strict rule of necessary conditions. 
Instead, a modification that allows for compensation of poor quality in one element by better 
quality in another element is introduced. (3) Compensation, however, cannot result in full 
compensation (substitutability). The larger the disequilibrium is, the lower the compensation 
will be. Thus, disequilibrium must be punished relative to equilibrium. (4) Punishment for 
equal degrees of disequilibrium should be equal, more for larger disequilibria, and less for 
smaller disequilibria. This implies a progressive discount when the disequilibrium is larger. (5) 
From this, it follows that punishment is disproportional and that the measure does not follow 
the rule of the mean but, rather, progression. (6) The increase in quality is progressive but 
yields diminishing marginal returns. We assume that, from a certain level on, an increase in 
quality in one or more elements boosts the quality of democracy, whereas, above a certain 
quality, increases in quality are smaller. Thus, the measure should be progressive and consider 
diminishing marginal utility in the increase of quality of democracy when a higher level is 
reached. To achieve progression, multiplication has been applied. To achieve diminished mar-
ginal returns, we apply an Arctan function: value of a function = (arctan (comp-
nent1*component2) *1.2/4000)*80. When there are three elements, we use the mean of the 
pairwise values, i.e.: value of a principle = {[(arctan(component1*component2) 
*1.2/4000)*80] + [(arctan(componentc1*component3)*1.2/4000)*80] + [(arctan(component2 
*component3)*1.2/4000)*80]} / 3. The formula is more complex when there are values below 
0. A more detailed description of our aggregation can be found in the methodological hand-
book at www.democracybarometer.org. 
14
 At the time of writing, the DB includes 30 blueprint countries (the 26 countries used in this 




In the following sections, we will combine the two data sets, i.e. we will reinvestigate 
empirically Lijphart’s proposition that consensus democracy goes hand in hand with 
a higher quality of democracy. Our analysis proceeds stepwise. In the first step, we 
aim at replicating Lijphart’s results. We will, thus, simply run regressions of the three 
consensus dimensions on overall democratic quality. In the second step, we aim at 
tapping the full potential the DB offers by analyzing the effect of the different con-
sensus dimensions on the nine functions outlined above (i.e. the mean values be-
tween 1995 and 2005). By taking into account the multidimensionality of democratic 
quality, we are able to gain deeper insights into the interplay between consensual 
institutions and the quality of democracy. In the last step, we will incorporate the 
multidimensionality not only of democratic quality but also of Lijphart’s typology. In 
particular, we will compare the democratic performance of different types of de-
mocracies, i.e. whether pure consensus democracies or mixed forms perform better. 
We base our tests on the country sample as presented in the second section (N=26). 
We use the factor scores of the three dimensions to explain the quality of democra-
cy in 2005. For the analysis of the impact of the three consensus dimensions on the 
overall quality of democracy, we are interested in a given instance of the quality of 
democracy within a particular year. However, to analyze and describe the different 
varieties of democracies (see Figures 3 and 4), i.e. the different functions, it makes 
more sense to base the analysis on the mean values of the different functions for the 
years 1995 to 2005 of the corresponding countries.
15
  
However, connecting the consensus with the DB data poses the problem of tautolo-
gy. The two data sets contain some variables that are completely identical or very 
similar to each other. When correlating the degree of consensus democracy with the 
index of democratic quality, the ensuing results could be the result of tautology. To 
tackle this problem, we use two versions of the DB, the original version, with all vari-
ables left untouched, and a modified version from which we remove all identical and 
similar variables from the DB and recalculate the components, functions, principles, 
and overall quality of democracy.
16
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 The main results do not change when we change the data, i.e. when we use the mean val-
ues of the quality of democracy or the values of the functions for 2005.  
16
 In the modified version of the DB, we sort out 11 variables: 1 from the ”Public Sphere” func-
tion: union (trade union density); 3 from the “Competition” function: Herfindex (Herfindahl 
index, the sum of the squared seat shares of all parties in the lower house of parliament), Nu-
party (number of important parties  [> 1% of votes] running for elections), and Effparrat (ratio 
of effective number of parties at the parliamentary level and the effective number of parties 
at the electoral level); 5 from the “Mutual Constraints” function: federgeta (federalism index 
as developed by Gerring and Thacker (2004)), nonunitar (degree of federalism and bicameral-
ism), subexp (subnational expenditures as a percentage of the total national expenditures), 
subrev (subnational revenues as a percentage of the total national revenues), and judrev (the 
extent to which judges - either Supreme Court or constitutional court - have the power to re-
view the constitutionality of laws); and 2 from the “Representation” function: Gallagindex (in-
dex of disproportionality between vote and seat distributions according to the Gallagher 
“Least Squares Index” for all parties in a general election), and dirdem (opportunities for direct 
influence on political decisions: Availability of mandatory and facultative referenda [account-
ed for coverage, terms of adoption, bondage, initiator, popular vote, hurdles]). For further de-
tails, see www.democracybarometer.org. 
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STEP 1:  CONSENSUS DIMENSIONS AND THE OVERALL 
QUALITY OF DEMOCRACY  
In the first step, we analyze whether the three dimensions of consensus democracy 
correlate with the quality of democracy. Thus, we model multivariate regressions for 
each dimension and the DB’s overall democratic quality index for 2005 (Table 2).  
We include several control variables that might affect the quality of democracy. They 
can be attributed to two different schools.
 17
 On the one hand, modernization theo-
rists argue that a country’s economic well-being positively affects its regime quality 
(Lipset, 1959; Przeworsky & Limongi, 1997). It is, therefore, expected that a coun-
try’s wealth contributes to democratic quality and that an economic crisis lowers the 
quality of democracy (Li & Reuveny, 2003).
18
 On the other hand, it is argued that the 
quality of democracy depends on human development (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005). 
Democratic quality is expected to increase when access to education is easy for all 
inhabitants and when the quality of life is high.
19
  
Table 2 shows the results of the multivariate regression analysis of the effect of con-
sensus democracy on overall democratic quality. They seem to support Lijphart’s 
thesis. Horizontal power sharing, i.e. the executive-parties dimension, is positively 
and significantly correlated with the quality of democracy; it does not matter 
whether we run the regression for the original measure of democratic quality or the 
modified version. To get a picture of the effect’s strength, it seems sensible to follow 
Lijphart (1999, p. 277) and compare a typical (but not extreme) majoritarian democ-
racy to a typical (but not extreme) consensus democracy having a value of -1 and 1 
on the executive-partiesy dimension, respectively. Accordingly, the difference be-
tween consensus and majoritarian democracy is about 15 points of the quality 
scores. Keeping in mind that the values of the indices of democratic quality
20
 vary 
between approximately 45 and 90, the size of the effect on democratic quality is re-
markable.  
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 Both theories certainly suffer from endogeneity; it remains unclear whether the quality of 
democracy depends on economic and human well-being or whether economic wealth and 
human development depend on democratic quality. However, we do not aim at investigating 
this relationship’s direction but to use the two approaches as controls. 
18
 The wealth of a country is measured by its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in con-
stant 2000 US $ (/1000). Economic crisis is measured by the rate of inflation. Both represent 
mean values over the period of 2002-2004.
18
 The data comes from the World Bank (2010) and 
from the IMF (2010), respectively. 
19
 The ease of access to education and the quality of life is measured with the respective indi-
ces in the Human Development Report (UNDP, 2010). Again, average values over the period of 
2002-2004 are taken. 
20
 There are slight changes depending on which version of the DB is considered. 
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T A B L E  2 :   T H R E E  C O N S E N S U S  D I M E N S I O N S  A N D  T H E  Q U A L I T Y  O F  D E M O C R A C Y  
( 2 0 0 5 )  –  M U L T I V A R I A T E  R E G R E S S I O N S  










































- - - - 
Federal-Unitary 
Dimension 












Controls       
















































Corr. R2 .67*** .37** .43*** .22* .36** .23* 
N 26 26 26 26 26 26 
Note: Multivariate models; not standardized B-coefficients; standard errors in brackets; * sig-
nificant at the 95% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level. The 
control variables are rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the 
highest value of the variable. Coefficients, therefore, indicate the change associated with mov-
ing from the lowest to the highest value.  
Moreover and in line with Lijphart’s (1999, p. 293) findings as well, vertical power di-
vision, i.e. the federal-unitary dimension does not covary significantly with demo-
cratic quality. An interesting additional finding is that the overall quality of democra-
cy seems not to depend on the third consensus dimension, i.e. the cabinet-direct 
democracy dimension. Both results remain stable no matter which version of the DB 
is considered. It has yet to be noted that the latter finding may not be interpreted as 
a general warning against direct democracy. In the end, it just says that the size of 
government cabinets in combination with the degree of consensual direct democrat-
ic institutions does not have a significant influence on overall democratic quality. 
However, as weakly developed direct democratic institutions as well as the total ab-
sence of direct democracy are treated as majoritarian traits, this result delivers some 
evidence pointing toward the conclusion that the introduction of consensual direct 
democratic institutions neither enhances nor diminishes democratic quality on the 
whole. 
At the same time, two of the four control variables covary with the quality of democ-
racy, as expected. The higher GDP per capita and the easier access to education in a 
country are, the higher the quality of democracy is in this country. However, neither 
quality of life nor inflation shows the suggested impact. Thus, modernization and 
human development theory are only partly upheld. However, what is most im-
portant for our concern is the fact that the positive effect of the horizontal power 
sharing dimension on the quality of democracy that Lijphart postulates persists even 




STEP 2:  ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIDIMENSIONALITY (1) 
The analysis involving the overall index of the quality of democracy can give us only a 
first and vague insight into the connection between consensus democracy and the 
quality of democracy. The Democracy Barometer considers democratic quality, at its 
base not a one-dimensional but a multidimensional concept. In the second step, we 
run similar multivariate regressions as in Table 2 above (with the same controls), 
though not on the overall index but on the different functions of the DB. Table 3 
summarizes the results of the 18 different models (again, we tested for the original 
as well as the modified version).  
At first sight, Table 3 confirms our findings from the previous section: horizontal 
power sharing performs much better than the other two dimensions. Still, the table 
is worth a second look. Indeed, the executive-parties dimension seems to enhance 
individual liberties, the public sphere, competition, and representation. Put another 
way, the more horizontal power sharing there is in a country, the better this country 
tends to fulfill these four functions. However, horizontal power sharing negatively af-
fects the function transparency. Thus, it seems that the sharing of power among po-
litical elites comes at the cost of a transparent political process. Sharing of power, in 
other words, appears – at least to some degree – to be based on secrecy. The nega-
tive effect on transparency makes intuitive sense since reaching a consensus might 
often require negotiations behind closed doors. This is a very nice example of the 
tradeoffs between the several functions of the DB. It is not possible to maximize all 
functions at the same time.  
T A B L E  3 :   T H R E E  D I M E N S I O N S  O F  C O N S E N S U S  A N D  T H E  F U N C T I O N S  O F  T H E  D E -








 o m o m o m 
Individual Liberties + +     
Rule of Law     - - 
Public Sphere + +     
Competition + +   + + 
Mutual Constraints   +    
Governmental Capability       
Transparency - -     
Participation       
Representation + +     
Note: + significant (at least at the 90% level) positive correlation in multivariate regression; -
significant (at least at the 90% level) negative correlation multivariate regression; o = original 
version; m = modified version.  
 
As for the vertical power dividing dimension, the findings are very weak. The federal-
unitary dimension correlates significantly with just one function of the DB: mutual 
constraints. However, this finding holds only for the unmodified data. Since the DB 
counts federal institutions as an important factor of mutual constraints, the positive 
connection with this dimension is most probably due to tautology. 
The third, i.e. the cabinet-direct democracy dimension, correlates significantly with 
two of the nine functions. While high values for this dimension positively affect 
competition, they are negatively associated with the rule of law. Both findings can 
 
16 
be nicely illustrated by the case of Switzerland, the prime example for (consensual) 
direct democratic institutions and oversized cabinets. First, the impartiality and in-
dependence of the judiciary is relatively underdeveloped in Switzerland. The de-
pendency of the third power is at least partly volitional and mirrors the idea of the 
direct influence of the people in all political decisions. The direct say of the citizens is 
valued higher than an independent judiciary.
21
 Second, the positive impact on com-
petition can also be partly explained by direct democracy; on the one hand, direct 
democratic settings are opportunities for different interest groups and parties to or-
ganize (Bühlmann & Freitag, 2004). On the other hand, direct democracy allows for 
occasional opposition for the parties that are in the government. Thus, the openness 
of the system (contestability) and the vulnerability are very high in Switzerland.  
In sum, running regressions not on overall democratic quality but on its different 
functions and, thus, taking into consideration the multidimensionality of the quality 
of democracy gives rise to two refinements of Lijphart’s thesis. Whereas, on the one 
hand, the horizontal consensus dimension appears indeed to be positively associat-
ed with several aspects of democratic quality, there is no impact on the four func-
tions, and there even seems to be a negative effect on transparency. More specifi-
cally, horizontal power sharing appears to strengthen individual liberties, an active 
public sphere, widespread competition, and equal representation, while the rule of 
law, mutual constraints, governmental capability, and the quality of participation are 
not influenced by this consensus dimension. Even worse, horizontal power sharing 
appears to bring about secrecy and low transparency. On the other hand, the third, 
i.e. the cabinet-direct democracy dimension, not originally considered by Lijphart – 
though not affecting overall democratic quality – also has an effect on two aspects of 
the quality of democracy. Namely, consensus democracy on the cabinet-direct de-
mocracy dimension seems to enhance competition and to undermine the rule of 
law. We agree fully, however, with Lijphart that the vertical power dividing dimen-
sion of consensus democracy has no direct relation to the quality of democracy. 
STEP 3:  ACCOUNTING FOR MULTIDIMENSIONALITY (2) 
In the last step, we tackle the question – left untouched by Lijphart – of the demo-
cratic performance of different types of democracies. Thus, we incorporate the mul-
tidimensionality of Lijphart’s typology as well of the quality of democracy. More spe-
cifically, we analyze by both graphic and statistical means the impact of different 
combinations of consensual and majoritarian traits on both the overall quality of 
democracy and the nine functions of the DB. We focus first on the two-dimensional 
pattern as suggested by Lijphart (1999) and then extend the analysis by including 
Vatter and Bernauer’s (2010) third dimension of consensus democracy. 
Given Lijphart’s two dimensions, we can distinguish four types of democracy. On one 
hand, the ideal types of consensus (consensus-federalist) and majoritarian democra-
cy (majoritarian-unitary) show only negative or positive values on the executive-
parties and on the federal-unitary dimension, respectively. The remaining two types, 
on the other hand, are mixed systems that either accentuate the horizontal power 
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 Recent popular referenda in Switzerland show this idea quite nicely. Even though some le-
gal experts argued that the ban on minarets, the deportation of criminal migrants, or the life-
long custody of sexual delinquents would be incompatible with international law, the election 
took place and the result (acceptance of the popular referendum each time) was adopted.  
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sharing dimension (consensus-unitary) or the vertical power dividing dimension (ma-
joritarian-federalist) (cf. Lijphart, 1999; Schmidt, 2010, p. 319ff). Combining the 
countries within these four types by taking the average of the function means of 
each country and illustrating these averages types with spiderwebs, we get a de-
scription of the varieties of democracies according to their degree of consensus.
22
 
F I G U R E  3 :  T Y P E S  O F  C O N S E N S U S  A N D  V A R I E T I E S  O F  D E M O C R A C I E S  ( 1 )  
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Note: IL: Individual Liberties; RL: Rule of Law; PS: Public Sphere; CO: Competition; MC: Mutual 
Constraints; GC: Governmental Capability; TR: Transparency; PA: Participation; RE: Represen-
tation; F: Freedom; C: Control; E: Equality; DQ: Overall Quality; all values are mean values of 
the countries within the types between 1995 and 2005; black line: mean of all 26 countries.  
Figure 3 shows that there are indeed differences among the different types of de-
mocracies concerning the fulfillment of the nine functions. Considering at first only 
the overall size of the shapes, we can see that the biggest sizes are formed by the 
mean values of the countries belonging to the consensus-unitary and the consensus-
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 For the graphical analyses, we used the original data of the Democracy Barometer.  
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federalist types followed by the majoritarian-federalist type of democracy. The 
smallest overall size can be found within the majoritarian type. This appears to be 
confirmation of Lijphart’s democratic quality thesis, i.e. that consensual traits on the 
horizontal, executive-parties dimension improve the quality of democracy. 
At second glance, however, we are able to further refine Lijphart’s thesis. First, Fig-
ure 3 indicates that it is the countries of the consensus-unitary type of democracy 
that form the biggest overall shape of democracy. Accordingly, it is this type that al-
so shows the highest average quality of democracy. Thus, it appears that a combina-
tion of consensus and majoritarian democracy, i.e. a combination of power sharing 
and unitarianism, brings about the best democracies. Pure consensus, i.e. the com-
bination of power dividing and power sharing, seems to perform slightly worse, 
though still better than both pure majoritarian and majoritarian-federalist democra-
cies.  
T A B L E  4 :   T H R E E  D I M E N S I O N S  O F  C O N S E N S U S  A N D  T H E  F U N C T I O N S  O F  T H E  D E -
M O C R A C Y  B A R O M E T E R  
 Quality of Democracy 
(original version) 




























Corr. R2 0.72*** 0.42** 
N 26 26 
Note: Multivariate models; not standardized B-coefficients; standard errors in brackets; * sig-
nificant at the 95% level; ** significant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level. The 
control variables are rescaled on a scale of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the 
highest value of the variable. Coefficients, therefore, indicate the change associated with mov-
ing from the lowest to the highest value.  
In purely technical terms, the superiority of the consensus-unitary over the pure 
consensus type suggests that the effect of the executive-parties dimension on dem-
ocratic quality depends on the federal-unitary dimension. Hence, it is possible to 
complement this finding with multivariate interaction models in which we are able 
to control for other important factors (see Table 4).
23
 We follow Brambor et al. 
(2006) and illustrate the marginal effect of the horizontal dimension on democratic 
quality as well as the confidence intervals graphically (see Figures 5 and 6). The fig-
ures show that consensual traits on the power sharing dimension indeed have a 
strong positive and significant effect on democratic quality in unitary states, irre-
spective of whether we consider the original version of the DB or the modified one. 
However, the size of the positive effect diminishes if we move into the direction of a 
federalist state and becomes statistically insignificant. This result remains constant if 
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 As of the relatively small N of 26, we do not include those controls that proved insignificant 
in step 1. 
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we leave out Italy, which is somewhat of an outlier case. As a result, our finding of 
the superiority of the consensus-unitary type over the consensus-federalist type 
with regard to the quality of democracy persists even when we control for additional 
factors, i.e. modernization and human development. 
F I G U R E  4 :  M A R G I N A L  E F F E C T  O F  T H E  E X E C U T I V E - P A R T I E S  D I M E N S I O N  O N  T H E  
Q U A L I T Y  O F  D E M O C R A C Y  ( O R I G I N A L  V E R S I O N )  
   
 
F I G U R E  5 :  M A R G I N A L  E F F E C T  O F  T H E  E X E C U T I V E - P A R T I E S  D I M E N S I O N  O N  T H E  
Q U A L I T Y  O F  D E M O C R A C Y  ( M O D I F I E D  V E R S I O N )  
 
 
Moreover, Lijphart’s thesis can be still further refined when considering the different 
functions (see Figure 3). It should not come as a surprise that the best mean fulfill-
ment of five of the nine functions can be found within the overall superior consen-
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parency, and representation). Again, this seems to confirm the suggestion that a 
combination of power sharing and unitarianism brings about the best democracies. 
However, three of the remaining four functions have the highest mean fulfillment 
within the consensus type of democracy. The countries within this type perform 
best, on average, in competition, governmental capability, and participation. This 
does not yet invalidate the finding of the overall superiority of the consensus-unitary 
type since the difference in performance regarding these three functions compared 
to those of pure consensus democracies is only marginal. Finally, the remaining func-
tion – mutual constraints – has the highest mean fulfillment in the country sample 
that belongs to the majoritarian-federalist type of democracy. Again, this is due pri-
marily to the fact that the DB counts federal institutions as an important factor of 
mutual constraints. It is, nonetheless, worth noting that the mutual constraints func-
tion has the lowest average value within the countries of the consensus-unitary type. 
Hence, and as the values of the principles in Figure 3 confirm as well, this type of 
democracy performs very well concerning freedom and equality but does poorer re-
garding control. 
Figure 3 further shows that the performance of the majoritarian-unitary democra-
cies is quite weak. However, the countries within this type show the lowest degree 
of fulfillment only within four of the nine functions (individual liberties, rule of law, 
public sphere, and competition). They exhibit, in particular, slightly better perfor-
mance than the majoritarian-federalist type countries with respect to governmental 
capability, participation, and representation.   
In a nutshell, we are able to still further refine Lijphart’s democratic quality thesis 
when incorporating the multidimensionality of both consensus democracy and the 
quality of democracy. While consensus on the horizontal dimension does, in fact and 
in line with Lijphart (1999), enhance the quality of democracy, it is the countries that 
primarily accentuate the horizontal dimension of consensus and not the vertical one, 
i.e. the consensus-unitary type, that perform best and not the pure consensus de-
mocracies, i.e. the countries that combine power sharing and power dividing. 
Similar but even more differentiated observations can be made when we include 
Vatter and Bernauer’s (2009) third dimension. Now, we can distinguish not four but 
eight different types of democracies. Namely, the four Lijphart-types are further di-
vided on the cabinet-direct democracy dimension. We now have majoritarian-unitary 
democracies with low values on the cabinet-direct democracy dimension, majoritari-
an-unitary democracies with high values on this dimension, and so on (see Figure 6).  
All in all, the results of the two-dimensional typology remain: the countries within 
the consensus-unitary and the consensus-federalist types, on the one hand, form the 
biggest shapes, whereas the sizes of the shapes of the majoritarian and the power-
dividing types are smaller. Thus, again, it is the horizontal dimension of consensus 
democracy that explains most of the differences regarding the quality of democracy. 
On the other hand, the consensus-unitary types perform slightly better than the 
pure consensus types; the suggestion that the combination of power sharing and 
unitarianism brings about the best democracies, hence, becomes ever more plausi-
ble. 
However, when including the cabinet-direct democracy dimension, the picture be-
comes more detailed. As shown in Figure 6, this third dimension has no clear-cut im-
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pact on the quality of democracy, i.e. – concerning the figures – on the shapes of 
democracy. For instance, a combination of high values on the third dimension for 
consensus-unitary democracy seems to increase the quality of democracy. On the 
other hand, high values for cabinet-direct democracy substantially diminish the size 
of the shape in majoritarian-federalist democracies.  
F I G U R E  6 :  T Y P E S  O F  C O N S E N S U S  A N D  V A R I E T I E S  O F  D E M O C R A C I E S  ( 2 )  
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Note: IL: Individual Liberties; RL: Rule of Law; PS: Public Sphere; CO: Competition; MC: Mutual 
Constraints; GC: Governmental Capability; TR: Transparency; PA: Participation; RE: Represen-
tation; F: Freedom; C: Control; E: Equality; DQ: Overall Quality; all values are mean values of 
the countries within the types between 1995 and 2005; black line: mean of all 26 countries.  
Again, there are, of course, interesting differences with respect to the several func-
tions. In looking only at the best and worst values of the degree of fulfillment of the 
nine functions, we get a quite different picture. Seven of the nine functions show the 
highest mean degree of fulfillment either in the countries belonging to the “consen-
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sus-unitary type (2) with a consensual top-to-bottom relation between government 
and population and high direct democracy” or in the countries within the “majoritar-
ian-federalist type (1) with a majoritarian top-to-bottom relation between govern-
ment and population.” While, in the former, individual liberties, the public sphere, 
and representation are fulfilled to a very high degree, the latter performs best with 
respect to the rule of law, mutual constraints, governmental capability, and trans-
parency. Participation is best fulfilled within the countries belonging to the “majori-
tarian-unitary type (2) with consensual top-to-bottom relations,” and competition 
has the highest mean value in the countries within the “consensus-federalist type (2) 
with consensual top-to-bottom relations.”  
The results concerning the worst degree of fulfillment shed further light on the con-
nection between consensus democracy and democratic quality. Six of the nine func-
tions show the lowest degree of fulfillment within the countries belonging to the 
“majoritarian-federalist type (2) with a consensual top-to-bottom relation between 
the government and the population.” In the three countries of this type, the mean 
values of the functions rule of law, public sphere, governmental capability, transpar-
ency, participation, and representation are the lowest of the eight types. The worst 
values for the remaining three functions can be found within the “majoritarian-
unitary type (2) with a consensual top-to-bottom relation (individual liberties),” the 
“majoritarian-federalist type (1) with majoritarian top-to-bottom relations (competi-
tion),” and the “consensus-unitary type (1) also with rather majoritarian top-to-
bottom relations between the government and the population (mutual con-
straints).” 
The inclusion of the third dimension does not disrupt our findings from the two-
dimensional typology: consensus democracy on the horizontal dimension enhances 
democratic quality while the combination of power sharing and unitarianism, i.e. the 
consensus-unitary type, performs best overall. However, the effect of consensual 
traits on the cabinet-direct democracy dimension seems to depend on the type of 
democracy. Democratic quality in the consensus-unitary type, for example, appears 
to profit from oversized cabinets and (consensual) direct democracy, whereas it 
seems to suffer remarkably from high values on the third dimension in majoritarian-
federalist democracies.  
CONCLUSION  
In his seminal work Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart demonstrates that consensus 
democracies are better democracies, i.e. that consensus democracy on the power 
sharing dimension brings about a higher quality of democracy. Lijphart’s analysis, 
however, suffers from a rather unsystematic and arbitrary choice of measures of 
democratic quality and from an implicit treatment of consensus democracy as a one-
dimensional concept. Our contribution aims at correcting for both. On the one hand, 
we make use of the recently introduced Democracy Barometer (DB), a measure of 
democratic quality that adequately incorporates its multidimensional conception 
and is, at the same time, able to distinguish the fine-grained differences regarding 
the quality of democracy in established democracies. On the other hand, we ana-
lyzed the association of not only the different consensus dimensions with democrat-
ic quality but also of the different types of democracies that Lijphart’s two-
 
23 
dimensional typology suggests. In doing this, we employed an improved, more up-
to-date measure of consensus democracy that incorporates direct democracy along 
with cabinet size as a third consensus dimension (Vatter & Bernauer, 2010).  
Our empirical analysis proceeded stepwise. In the first step, we aimed at replicating 
Lijphart’s (1999) results and conducted regression analyses of the single consensus 
dimensions on overall democratic quality. The results of this very simple analysis 
suggest that Lijphart was right; the horizontal, i.e. the power sharing dimension, 
does indeed appear to be associated with higher democratic quality, whereas the 
vertical, i.e. the power dividing dimension, does not. The fact that the third dimen-
sion of consensus democracy not originally contemplated by Lijphart, i.e. the cabi-
net-direct democracy dimension, seems to have no significant effect on democratic 
quality constitutes an interesting additional finding. Though this may certainly not be 
understood as a general warning against direct democracy, it nonetheless indicates 
that the introduction of consensual direct democratic institutions does not improve 
democratic quality on the whole.  
In the second step, we aspired to exploit the DB’s multidimensional conception of 
democratic quality and, hence, to get deeper insights into the interplay between 
consensual institutions and different aspects of the quality of democracy. Regression 
analyses on the different functions of the DB yielded two striking findings. First, 
though the power sharing dimension seems to be positively correlated with a fair 
share of the nine functions of the DB, there is no impact on the three functions. Even 
worse, power sharing appears to bring about secrecy. Consensual traits on the hori-
zontal dimension seem to come at the cost of transparency, arguably since reaching 
a consensus often requires negotiations behind closed doors. This constitutes a nice 
example of the incongruence of some aspects of democratic quality. It is impossible 
to maximize all functions of the DB at the same time. Second, the cabinet-direct de-
mocracy dimension – while not affecting the overall quality of democracy – has an 
effect on two functions of democratic quality. High values on this dimension en-
hance competition but undermine the rule of law. Both appear as a consequence of 
strongly developed direct democratic institutions: while the direct say of the people 
is rated higher in a fully developed direct democracy than an independent judiciary, 
direct democracy provides more opportunities for political actors to organize and 
mobilize in comparison to other institutional settings.  
In the third, final step, we aimed at incorporating the multidimensionality of Li-
jphart’s typology and assessed the performance of the different types of democra-
cies. More specifically, we analyzed by both graphic and statistical means the effects 
of different combinations of values on the three consensus dimensions on both 
overall democratic quality and the nine functions. We find that the consensus-
unitary type, i.e. a combination of horizontal power sharing and unitarianism, per-
forms best overall, particularly if accompanied by consensual traits on the cabinet-
direct democracy dimension. Most importantly, it is not the pure consensus democ-
racy, i.e. countries having consensual traits on every dimension, that perform best – 
though they do certainly fairly well. Pure majoritarian democracies generally per-
form as badly as the majoritarian-federalist type, i.e. those that have a combination 
of vertical power division and majoritarian traits on the horizontal dimension. There 
is yet one interesting exception: a relatively high quality of democracy appears to 




All in all, the results of our empirical analysis suggest that Lijphart is right, but only in 
principle. Indeed, overall democratic quality seems to profit from power sharing. Li-
jphart’s democratic quality thesis can yet be refined in two important ways. On the 
one hand, power sharing does not enhance every aspect of the quality of democra-
cy, and transparency apparently even suffers. On the other hand, at least with re-
gard to democratic quality, the combination of consensus and majoritarian traits ap-
pears to matter. In particular, power sharing in combination with unitarianism and 
consensual traits on the third dimension fares best and notably better than pure 
consensus democracies. The latter finding, though, has to be treated with caution. 
Even if our suggestion that pure consensus performs slightly worse with respect to 
the quality of democracy is valid, it might, according to classic consociationalist theo-
ry, have other advantages, above all in ethnically and/or linguistically divided socie-
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